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Scholars agree that societal-level moral codes that promote social trust also promote wealth cre-
ation.  However, what specific kinds of societal-level moral codes promote social trust?  Also, by 
what specific kind of competitive process does social trust promote wealth creation?  Because 
societal-level moral codes are composed of or formed from peoples’ personal moral codes, this 
article explores a theory of ethics, known as the “Hunt-Vitell” theory of ethics, that illuminates the 
concept of personal moral codes and uses the theory to discuss which types of personal moral 
codes foster trust and distrust in society.  This article then uses resource-advantage (R-A) theory, 
one of the most completely articulated dynamic theories of competition, to show the process by 
which trust-promoting, societal-level moral codes promote productivity and economic growth.   
That is, they promote wealth creation.
Introduction
How does trust within a society relate to that society’s 
productivity  and  economic  growth,  that  is,  its  wealth 
creation?   Scholars across a wide range of disciplines 
maintain  that  societal-level  moral  codes  that  promote 
social  trust  promote  wealth  creation  (e.g.,  Fukuyama, 
1995; Gambetta, 1988; Harrison, 1992; Phelps, 1975). In 
economics, for example, Arrow (1972) hypothesized over 
three decades ago that because “[v]irtually every com-
mercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, 
…[it] can be plausibly argued that much of the economic 
backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack 
of mutual confidence”. (p. 357). He refers to trust as one 
of society’s “invisible institutions.” As such, trust stems 
from “principles of ethics and morality” and promotes 
economic growth because it is an “important lubricant of 
the social system” (Arrow, 1974, pp. 23, 26).
As a second example, Harrison (1992, p.1), an eco-
nomic development advisor, asks: “Why do some na-
tions and ethnic groups do better than others?”  And he 
answers: “The overriding significance of culture is the 
paramount lesson I have learned in my thirty years of 
work on political, economic, and social development.”   
What, then, are the characteristics of a culture that will 
engender prosperity, one that is progress-prone? This 
is Harrison’s (1992) answer:
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There are, in my view, four fundamental factors: (1) 
the degree of identification with others in a society 
- the radius of trust, or the sense of community; (2) 
the rigor of the ethical system; (3) the way authority 
is exercised within the society; and (4) attitudes about 
work, innovation, saving, and profit. (p. 16)
The radius of trust, for Harrison (1992), is the ex-
tent to which individuals identify with, or have a sense 
of community with, others in a society. The smallest 
radius of trust is a society in which individuals trust 
only themselves. Next would be those in which the ra-
dius extends only to members of the immediate family 
and other kin. Because of the narrow radius of trust 
in “familistic” societies: “Commercial and industrial 
enterprises…are usually weighted down by centraliza-
tion, including a variety of checking mechanisms and 
procedures designed…to control dishonesty” (p. 11).
As a third example, Fukuyama (1995, p. 267), a so-
cial policy analyst, sees a “crisis of trust” and maintains 
that trust is the sine qua non of societal productivity 
and economic growth.  Defining trust as “the expec-
tation…of regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, 
based on commonly shared norms” (p. 26), he main-
tains that a community’s set of shared ethical values 
contributes to its capacity for spontaneous sociability, 
which “refers to the wide range of intermediate com-
munities, distinct from the family or those deliberately 
established by governments” (p. 27).  Indeed, where 
sociability and trust are low, governments often have 
to step in to promote community. 
Fukuyama  (1995)  argues  that  spontaneous  socia-
bility contributes to the ability of high-trust societies 
to innovate organizationally. In contrast, in low-trust 
societies, where the radius of trust extends only to kin, 
the cooperation necessary for large corporations can 
be obtained only “under a system of formal rules and 
regulations, which have to be negotiated, agreed to, 
litigated, and enforced, sometimes by coercive means” 
(p. 27).  This legal and regulatory apparatus, which is 
unnecessary in a high-trust society, serves as a substi-
tute for trust and imposes a high burden of transaction 
costs on low-trust societies: “Widespread distrust in 
a society, in other words, imposes a kind of tax on all 
forms of economic activity, a tax that high-trust societ-
ies do not have to pay” (pp. 27-28).
In short, a consensus is developing that societal-level 
moral codes that promote social trust promote wealth 
creation.  The purpose of this article is to contribute to 
our understanding of the nature of the kinds of soci-
etal-level moral codes that are thought to promote so-
cial trust.  Furthermore, this article contributes to our 
understanding of how trust-promoting, societal-level 
moral codes promote wealth creation.  
This article is structured as follows. First, because 
societal-level moral codes are composed of (or formed 
from) peoples’ personal moral codes, I explore a theory 
of ethics, known as the “Hunt-Vitell” theory of ethics, 
that illuminates the concept of personal moral codes.   
I use this theory to discuss which types of personal 
moral codes foster trust and distrust in society. Second, 
as to how trust-promoting, societal-level moral codes 
promote wealth creation, I note that this question re-
quires understanding the dynamic nature of competi-
tion.  Therefore, I review what has come to be known 
as  the  “resource-advantage  theory  of  competition” 
or “R-A theory,” which is one of the most completely 
articulated,  most  widely  cited,  dynamic  theories  of 
competition. (The original article that developed the 
theory has been cited over 1,200 times, and a search 
for  “resource-advantage  theory”  yields  over  75,000 
“hits.”)  The article then uses R-A theory to show how 
trust-promoting, societal-level moral codes influence 
the process of competition in such a way that wealth 
creation occurs.  
The Hunt-Vitell theory of ethics
The purpose of the original article that developed the 
Hunt-Vitell (H-V) theory—which has been cited over 
1200 times—was to (1) provide a general theory of 
ethical decision-making and (2) represent the theory 
in a process model (Hunt & Vitell, 1986). The theory 
would draw on both the deontological and teleological 
ethical traditions in moral philosophy. While deontolo-
gists believe that “certain features of the act itself other 
than the value it brings into existence” make an action 
or rule right, teleologists “believe that there is one and 
only one basic or ultimate right-making characteristic, 
namely, the comparative value (nonmoral) of what is, 
probably will be, or is intended to be brought into be-
ing” (Frankena, 1963, p. 14).  
Since its original development, the H-V model has 
undergone  extensive  discussion  and  empirical  test-
ing, which resulted in a modest revision. The discus-
sion here follows the revised model in Hunt and Vitell 6 Shelby D. Hunt
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(2006), which is displayed in Figure 1.  The model ad-
dresses the situation in which an individual confronts 
a problem perceived as having ethical content.  This 
perception  of  an  ethical  problem  in  the  situation 
triggers  the  process  depicted  by  the  model.    If  the 
individual does not perceive some ethical content in 
a problem situation, subsequent elements of the model 
do not come into play. Given that an individual per-
ceives a situation as having ethical content, the next 
step is the perception of various possible alternatives 
or actions that might be taken to resolve the ethical 
problem. It is unlikely that an individual will recognize 
the complete set of possible alternatives. Therefore, the 
evoked set of alternatives will be less than the universe 
of potential alternatives. Indeed, ultimate differences 
in behaviors among individuals in situations that have 
ethical content may be traced, in part, to differences in 
their sets of perceived alternatives.
Figure 1. Hunt-Vitell Theory of Ethics. The portion of the model outside the dashed lines constitutes the general theory.  The 
portion inside the dashed lines individuates the general model for professional and managerial contexts. Source: Hunt and 
Vitell (1986, 1993).  Copyright © 1991 by Shelby D. Hunt and Scott J. Vitell
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Figure 1: Hunt-Vitell Theory of Ethics 
SOURCE: Hunt and Vitell (1986, 1993).  Copyright © 1991 by Shelby D. Hunt and Scott J. Vitell.   
NOTE: The portion of the model outside the dashed lines constitutes the general theory.  The portion inside 
the dashed lines individuates the general model for professional and managerial contexts. 
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Once  the  individual  perceives  the  evoked  set  of 
alternatives, two kinds of evaluations will take place:   
a  deontological  evaluation  and  a  teleological  evalu-
ation. In the process of deontological evaluation, the 
individual evaluates the inherent rightness or wrong-
ness of the behaviors implied by each alternative.  The 
process involves comparing each alternative’s behav-
iors with a set of predetermined deontological norms. 
These  norms  represent  personal  values  or  rules  of 
moral behavior.  They range from (1) general beliefs 
about things such as honesty, stealing, cheating, and 
treating people fairly to (2) issue-specific beliefs about 
things such as deceptive advertising, product safety, 
sales “kickbacks,” confidentiality of data, respondent 
anonymity, and interviewer dishonesty.  The norms, 
according to H-V theory, take the form of beliefs of the 
following kinds:  “It is always right to … ;”  “it is gener-
ally or usually right to … ;” “it is always wrong to…;” 
and “it is generally or usually wrong to…”
The deontological norms include both the “hyper-
norms”  and  “local  norms”  of  the  integrative  social 
contracts theory of Donaldson and Dunfee (1994) and 
Dunfee, Smith, and Ross (1999). Contrasted with spe-
cific,  community-based,  “local  norms,”  hypernorms 
are universal norms that represent “principles so fun-
damental to human existence that…we would expect 
them to be reflected in a convergence of religious, phil-
osophical, and cultural beliefs” (Donaldson & Dunfee, 
1994, p. 265). These hypernorms represent “a thin set 
of universal principles that would constrain the relativ-
ism of community moral free space” (Dunfee, Smith, 
& Ross, 1999, p.19). In the area of business ethics, they 
offer examples of hypernorms such as informing em-
ployees about dangerous health hazards and employ-
ees’ rights to physical security.  
In contrast to the deontological evaluation, the tele-
ological evaluation process focuses on four constructs: 
(1)  the  perceived  consequences  of  each  alternative 
for  various  stakeholder  groups,  (2)  the  probability 
that each consequence will occur to each stakeholder 
group,  (3)  the  desirability  or  undesirability  of  each 
consequence, and (4) the importance of each stake-
holder group.  Both the identity and importance of 
the  stakeholder  groups  will  vary  across  individuals 
and situations. For example, the stakeholders may (or 
may not) include one’s self, family, friends, customers, 
stockholders, suppliers, or employees.
Although the H-V theory proposes that the teleo-
logical evaluation process is influenced by the desir-
ability and probability of consequences, as well as the 
importance of stakeholders, no specific information-
processing  rule  (such  as  a  lexicographic  process)  is 
postulated.  Indeed, the model proposes that the in-
formation-processing rules will differ across different 
people’s personal moral codes. The overall result of the 
teleological evaluation will be beliefs about the rela-
tive goodness versus badness brought about by each 
alternative, as perceived by the decision maker.  One 
interpretation of the teleological evaluation (TE) pro-
cess for an alternative K, with regard to stakeholders 
1, 2, 3,…m, who have differing importance weights 
(IW) is:
          n = m
ΤΕΚ = Σ  [IW1 x PosCon1 x PPos] – [IW1 x NegCon1 x PNeg]
          n = 1
+ [IW2 x PosCon2 x PPos] – [IW2 x NegCon2 x PNeg] +  . . . 
In this formula:
  IW1 = Importance of stakeholder 1
  PosCon1 = Positive consequences on stakeholder 1
  NegCon1 = Negative consequences on stakeholder 1
 P pos = Probability of positive consequences occurring
 P Neg = Probability of negative consequences occurring
We stress that the formula represents an interpretation 
of the teleological evaluation process. We do not posit 
that people actually make these detailed calculations. 
Instead, we propose, people actually go through an in-
formal process for which the formula is an idealized, 
formalized representation.  
The core of the model comes next. The H-V theory 
posits  that  an  individual’s  ethical  judgments  (for  ex-
ample, the belief that a particular alternative is the most 
ethical  alternative)  are  a  function  of  the  individual’s 
deontological  evaluation  (i.e.,  applying  norms  of  be-
havior to each of the alternatives) and the individual’s 
teleological evaluation (i.e., an evaluation of the sum to-
tal of goodness versus badness likely to be provided by 
each alternative for all relevant stakeholders).  That is, EJ 
= f(DE, TE), where “EJ” is Ethical Judgments, “DE” is 
Deontological Evaluation and “TE” is Teleological Eval-
uation.  It is possible that some individuals in some situ-
ations will be strict (e.g., “Kantian”) deontologists and, 
therefore, will completely ignore the consequences of al-
ternative actions (i.e., TE = zero).  However, the theory 8 Shelby D. Hunt
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maintains that it is unlikely that such a result would be 
found across many individuals and different situations.   
Similarly, though it is possible that some people in some 
situations might be strict (e.g., “utilitarian”) teleologists 
(i.e., DE = zero), such a result is unlikely across many 
individuals and situations.
Consistent with general theories in consumer be-
havior (e.g., Engel, Blackwell, & Kollat, 1978; How-
ard & Sheth,1969) and the Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) 
model, the H-V model posits that ethical judgments 
impact behavior through the intervening variable of 
intentions.  Like Petty and Cacioppo (1986) and Jones 
(1991),  the  H-V  model  proposes  that  both  ethical 
judgments and intentions should be better predictors 
of behavior in situations where the ethical issues are 
central, rather than peripheral.  
The  H-V  model  proposes  that  ethical  judgments 
will sometimes differ from intentions because TE also 
independently  affects  intentions.  That  is,  though  an 
individual may perceive a particular alternative as the 
most ethical, the person may intend to choose another 
alternative because of certain preferred consequences 
(e.g., there might be significant positive consequences 
to one’s self as a result of choosing the less ethical al-
ternative). The theory suggests that when behavior and 
intentions  are  inconsistent  with  ethical  judgments, 
there will be feelings of guilt.  Therefore, two individu-
als, A and B, may engage in the same behavior, yet only 
A may feel guilty, because B’s behavior is consistent 
with his or her ethical beliefs.
What is called action control in the model is the ex-
tent to which an individual actually exerts control in 
the enactment of an intention in a particular situation 
(Ajzen, 1985; Tubbs & Ekeberg, 1991).  That is, situ-
ational constraints may result in behaviors that are in-
consistent with intentions and ethical judgments.  One 
such situational constraint may be the opportunity to 
adopt  a  particular  alternative.    Zey-Ferrell,  Weaver, 
and Ferrell (1979) empirically document the influence 
of opportunity on behavior in situations having ethical 
content.  Similarly, Mayer (1970) identifies opportunity 
as being a condition that impinges on ethical behavior.
After behavior, there will be an evaluation of the 
actual consequences of the alternative selected.  This 
is the major learning construct in the model.  These 
actual consequences provide feedback to the category 
of  variables  labeled  “Personal  Characteristics.”    He-
garty  and  Sims  (1978)  examined  whether  a  system 
of perceived rewards and punishments could change 
behaviors  in  a  situation  involving  ethical  content.   
They concluded that “the results lend support to the 
notion that many individuals can be conditioned (i.e., 
can “learn”) to behave unethically under appropriate 
contingencies” (p. 456). Conversely, of course, the H-V 
theory maintains that individuals can be conditioned 
to behave ethically.
The  H-V  model  identifies  several  personal  char-
acteristics that might influence specific aspects of the 
ethical, decision-making process. Unquestionably, an 
individual’s personal religion influences ethical deci-
sion  making.  A  priori,  compared  with  nonreligious 
people,  one  might  suspect  that  (1)  highly  religious 
people would have more clearly defined deontological 
norms and (2) such norms would play a stronger role 
in ethical judgments.  Vitell, Paolillo, and Singh (2005), 
in a consumer ethics setting, examined the impact of 
both intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity on ethical be-
liefs, where the former is characterized by individuals 
sincerely incorporating faith and religious beliefs into 
everyday life, and the latter is characterized by individ-
uals simply using religion as a source of comfort, social 
support, self-justification, and/or status. Their findings 
indicate that while extrinsic religiosity has little impact 
on one’s ethical beliefs, intrinsic religiosity is a signifi-
cant determinant of consumer ethical beliefs.   
An individual’s value system would also impact the 
decision process.  In general, we urge researchers to 
explore many different values and the extent to which 
these values impact ethical decision making.  Consider, 
for example, “organizational commitment” as one such 
value. Hunt, Wood, and Chonko (1989) found corpo-
rations that have high ethical values will, subsequently, 
have employees more committed to the organization’s 
welfare.  This is an apparently positive outcome.  How-
ever,  is  it  possible  that  individuals  exhibiting  high 
organizational commitment (even because of the or-
ganization’s ethical values) will then place such great 
importance  on  the  welfare  of  the  organization  that 
they may engage in questionable behavior if such be-
havior were thought to be beneficial to the organiza-
tion?  A four-country study (Vitell & Paolillo, 2004) 
indicates a link between organizational commitment 
and the decision maker’s perception that ethics should 
be a long-term, top priority of the organization.Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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“Belief  systems”  focuses  on  the  individual’s  set  of 
beliefs about the world. For example, one might con-
sider Machiavellianism as a belief system, as has been 
explored by Singhapakdi and Vitell (1991).  More gener-
ally, the kinds of beliefs the H-V model emphasizes are 
those that reflect how the individual believes the world 
“works.”  To what extent does an individual believe that 
all people are motivated solely by self-interest?  In moral 
philosophy terms, to what extent does a person believe 
all others are guided by ethical egoism? The model sug-
gests that, to the extent that an individual believes this is 
how the world actually “works,” this belief will guide the 
individual’s behavior by influencing the perceived con-
sequences of alternatives and their probabilities.
Strength of moral character has been argued to be 
an important moderator of the relationship between 
intentions  and  behavior  by  Williams  and  Murphy 
(1990).  Drawing on Aristotle’s virtue ethics, Williams 
and Murphy emphasize, among other things, the im-
portant function of role models in developing a virtu-
ous moral character (i.e., one having such virtues as 
perseverance, courage, integrity, compassion, candor, 
fidelity,  prudence,  justice,  public-spiritedness  and 
humility).  Thus, those individuals with high moral 
character would have the strength of will to behave in 
a manner consistent with their ethical judgments.
The subject of cognitive moral development (Kohl-
berg,  1984;  Rest,  1986;  Trevino,  1986)  has  received 
much attention in the ethics literature.  A study by 
Goolsby and Hunt (1992) found that marketing prac-
titioners compare favorably with other social groups 
in their level of cognitive moral development.  Fur-
thermore, they found that marketers scoring high on 
cognitive moral development tend to be female, highly 
educated, and high in social responsibility.  Because 
a higher stage of cognitive moral development implies 
a greater capacity to reason through complex ethical 
situations, it would seem that individuals high in cog-
nitive moral development would, among other things, 
(1) bring in more deontological norms in any situation 
and (2) would consider the interests of more stake-
holders in their decision making.  
As a final personal characteristic, some people are, 
quite simply, more ethically sensitive than others.  That 
is, when placed in a decision-making situation having 
an  ethical  component,  some  people  never  recognize 
that there is an ethical issue involved at all.  Recall that 
the model starts with the perception that there is, indeed, 
some ethical problem involved in the situation. The sys-
tematic study of ethical sensitivity has begun in the areas 
of dentistry (Bebeau, Rest, & Yamoor, 1985), professional 
counseling (Volker, 1979), and accounting (Shaub, 1989).   
In marketing, Sparks and Hunt (1998) explored the ethi-
cal sensitivity of marketing researchers and found, among 
other things, that their sample of practitioners was more 
ethically sensitive to research ethics issues than a sample 
comprised of marketing students.  They conclude that 
“the  greater  ethical  sensitivity  exhibited  by  marketing 
research practitioners can be attributed to their socializa-
tion into the marketing research profession, that is, by 
their learning the ethical norms of marketing research” 
(Sparks & Hunt, 1998, p. 105).
The H-V model stresses the importance of “Cultural 
Environment”  in  influencing  the  process  of  ethical 
decision making.  As components of culture, the H-V 
model suggests that researchers focus attention on re-
ligion, legal systems, and political systems.  
The boxes in the model labeled “Industry Environ-
ment,” “Professional Environment” and “Organizational 
Environment” specifically orient the model toward ethi-
cal situations for businesspeople and the professions.   
The H-V model proposes that all industries, profession-
al associations and organizations have complex sets of 
norms, some of which are often formalized in codes, but 
most of which are informal norms communicated in the 
processes.  These norms, therefore, form a framework 
by which individuals are socialized into their respective 
organizations, professions and industries.  
There have been scores of studies that have used the 
H-V model as a theoretical foundation for empirical 
investigation and/or theoretical analysis.  Examples of 
the tests include the works of Burns and Kiecker (1995), 
Donoho, Polonsky, Herche and Swenson (1999), Hunt 
and Vasquez-Parraga (1993), Mayo and Marks (1990), 
Menguc (1997), Singhapakdi and Vitell (1990, 1991), 
and Vitell and Hunt (1990). In general, empirical re-
sults tend to support the theory.  I turn now to using 
the H-V model to explicate the concept of personal 
moral code and its relationship to trust and distrust.
Personal moral codes, trust, and 
distrust
The H-V model provides a framework for explicat-
ing people’s personal moral codes, trust, and distrust.   10 Shelby D. Hunt
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According to the H-V model, differences in personal 
moral codes result from differences in:
•	 the	rules	for	combining	the	deontological	and	te-
leological evaluations;
•	 the	deontological	norms	held;	
•	 the	relative	importance	of	particular	norms;
•	 the	rules	for	resolving	conflicts	among	norms;
•	 the	rules	for	interpreting	the	applicability	of	norms	
in particular situations;
•	 the	 importance	 weights	 assigned	 to	 particular	
stakeholders;
•	 the	rules	for	combining	the	teleological	components;
•	 the	perceived	positive	consequences	for	particular	
(e.g., highly important) stakeholders;
•	 the	perceived	negative	consequences	for	particular	
(e.g., very unimportant) stakeholders;
•	 the	perceived	probabilities	of	positive	and	negative	
consequences for particular stakeholders.
Some people’s personal moral codes emphasize deon-
tological factors; others emphasize teleological factors.   
Some codes are trust-inducing; others produce distrust.
Consider  the  personal  moral  code  implied  by  the 
neoclassical tradition in economics.  Neoclassical eco-
nomics assumes that everyone is a utility maximizer, 
which is interpreted as self-interest maximization.  In 
terms of the H-V model, Deontological Evaluation is 
zero, and all ethical judgements are formed solely by 
Teleological Evaluation. Furthermore, the importance 
weights assigned to all stakeholders other than one’s self 
are assigned zero. Therefore, in the neoclassical tradi-
tion  in  economics,  all  persons  have  personal  moral 
codes that lead them to choose the alternative that has 
the highest score in a highly circumscribed Teleological 
Evaluation process in which the importance weights for 
all stakeholders other than one’s self are zero.  
For example, Williamson’s (1975, p. 255) transaction 
cost economics assumes that “economic man…is thus 
a more subtle and devious creature than the usual self-
interest seeking assumption reveals.”  For transaction cost 
economics, homo economics not only self-interest maxi-
mizes but does so with opportunistic “guile.”  Williamson 
argues for assuming universal opportunism because it is 
“ubiquitous” (1981, p. 1550), “even among the less oppor-
tunistic types, most have their price” (1979, p. 234), and 
opportunistic “types cannot be distinguished ex ante from 
sincere types” (1975, p. 27) or, at the very least, “it is very 
costly to distinguish opportunistic from nonopportunis-
tic types ex ante” (1981, p. 1545). Even though, as Wil-
liamson acknowledges, “to craft credible commitments…
is to create functional substitutes for trust,” (1994, p. 7) 
he maintains that “the study of economic organization is 
better served by treating economic organization without 
reference to trust” (1993, p. 99).  
The preceding shows how some personal moral codes 
spawn distrust.  Specifically, if a society’s dominant cul-
ture actually focuses solely on Teleological Evaluation, 
with  importance  weights  of  zero  for  all  stakeholders 
other than one’s self, then social trust cannot exist: the 
universal opportunism of such a restricted moral code 
implies that one must always presume nontrustworthy 
behavior by others. As a consequence, Etzioni (1988) 
points out: “The more people accept the [utility maximi-
zation part of the] neoclassical paradigm as a guide for 
their behavior, the more their ability to sustain a market 
economy is undermined.”( p. 257)
Etzioni (1988) cites empirical studies suggesting that 
neoclassical theory, as interpreted by students, licenses 
opportunism.    For  students,  “is”  becomes  “ought.” 
For example, the studies of Marwell and Ames (1981) 
find a positive correlation between formal training in 
economics and the frequency of free riding. If every-
one free rides, students apparently conclude that they 
might as well free ride also. As a second example, Frank, 
Gilovich, and Regan (1993) distributed questionnaires 
to students concerning their likelihood of engaging in 
dishonest behavior at the beginning and end of three 
classes: (1) an economics class in which both the book 
and the instructor stressed neoclassical theory, (2) an 
economics class in which the book stressed neoclas-
sical theory but the instructor did not, and (3) an as-
tronomy class as a control.  Students in all three classes 
were more dishonest at the end of the semester than at 
the beginning.  However, the shift toward dishonesty 
by students in the two economics classes was greater 
than that of those in the control group.  Furthermore, 
the shift toward dishonesty was greater in the econom-
ics class where the professor emphasized and support-
ed neoclassical theory than in the class where only the 
textbook did so.  Students, as Etzioni (1988) points out, 
are indeed “learning” the lesson of neoclassical theory: 
opportunism is universal, why fight it?
If personal moral codes that presume utility maxi-
mization  spawn  distrust,  which  moral  codes  pres-
ent trust?  Etzioni (1988) argues for personal moral Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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codes  that—in  terms  of  the  H-V  model—focus  on 
the top half of the model, that is, the Deontological 
Evaluation.  Specifically, he argues for codes that are 
based on deontological ethics because a society whose 
dominant culture embraces deontological ethics can 
sustain social trust and enjoy its wealth-creating at-
tributes.  That is, when the people of a society share 
a moral code based primarily on deontological ethics, 
trust can exist.  When trust exists, the costs that firms 
and societies have that are associated with opportun-
ism, i.e., shirking, cheating, stealing, dishonesty, moni-
toring, free-riding, and “hostage-taking,” are avoided. 
Consequently,  argues  Etzioni  (1988),  a  culture  that 
emphasizes deontological ethics should contribute to 
a society’s productivity.   
If (at the micro-level) the primary objective of firms 
is  superior  financial  performance  (e.g.  more  profit 
than last year or a return on investment greater than 
one’s competitors), but (at the macro-level) a key fac-
tor distinguishing wealthy from nonwealthy societies 
is trust-promoting institutions, the challenge for any 
theory of markets and any dynamic theory of com-
petition within markets is to explicate the process by 
which such macro-level, trust-promoting institutions 
as moral codes can contribute to (or from) firm-level, 
superior  financial  performance.  A  detailed  example 
shows how R-A theory explicates this process.
The resource-advantage theory 
of competition
Resource-advantage theory is an evolutionary, process 
theory of competition that is interdisciplinary in the 
sense that it has been developed in the literatures of 
several different disciplines.  These disciplines include 
marketing  (Foss  2000;  Hodgson  2000;  Hunt  1997a; 
1999; 2000b; c; 2001; 2002a; b; Hunt & Arnett 2001; 
2003; 2004; Hunt & Derozier 2004; Hunt & Madha-
varam 2006a; b; Hunt & Morgan 1995; 1996; 1997; 
2005; Morgan & Hunt 2002), management (Hunt 1995; 
2000a; Hunt & Lambe 2000), economics (Hunt 1997b; 
c; d; 2000d; 2002c), ethics (Arnett & Hunt 2002), law 
(Grengs 2006), and general business (Hunt 1998; Hunt 
& Arnett 2006; Hunt & Duhan 2002).  R-A theory is 
also interdisciplinary in that it draws on, and has affin-
ities with, numerous other theories and research tra-
ditions, including evolutionary economics, “Austrian” 
economics, the historical tradition, the resource-based 
tradition, the competence-based tradition, institution-
al economics, and economic sociology.  
The knowledge content of a research tradition de-
rives from its foundational premises. As introduced 
in Hunt and Morgan (1995; 1997) and further expli-
cated in Hunt (2000b), the foundational premises of 
resource-advantage theory are: 
P1. Demand is heterogeneous across industries, het-
erogeneous within industries, and dynamic.
P2. Consumer information is imperfect and costly.
P3. Human  motivation  is  constrained  self-interest 
seeking.
P4. The  firm’s  objective  is  superior  financial  perfor-
mance.
P5. The firm’s information is imperfect and costly.
P6. The firm’s resources are financial, physical, legal, 
human,  organizational,  informational,  and  rela-
tional.
P7. Resource  characteristics  are  heterogeneous  and 
imperfectly mobile.
P8. The role of management is to recognize, understand, 
create, select, implement, and modify strategies.
P9. Competitive dynamics are disequilibrium-provok-
ing, with innovation endogenous.
The structure and foundations of
 R-A theory
Our  overview  of  the  structure  and  foundations  of 
R-A theory will follow closely the theory’s treatment 
in Hunt (2000b).  Resource-advantage theory is a gen-
eral theory of competition that describes the process 
of competition. Figures 2 and 3 provide schematic de-
pictions of R-A theory’s key constructs. Using Hodg-
son’s (1993) taxonomy, R-A theory is an evolutionary, 
disequilibrium-provoking, process theory of competi-
tion, in which innovation and organizational learning 
are endogenous, firms and consumers have imperfect 
information, and in which entrepreneurship, institu-
tions, and public policy affect economic performance.   
Evolutionary theories of competition require units of 
selection that are (1) relatively durable, that is, they can 
exist, at least potentially, through long periods of time, 
and (2) heritable, that is, they can be transmitted to 
successors.  For R-A theory, both firms and resources 
are proposed as the heritable, durable units of selec-
tion, with competition for comparative advantages in 
resources constituting the selection process.12 Shelby D. Hunt
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Figure 2: A Schematic of the Resource-Advantage Theory of Competition. Adapted from Hunt and Morgan (1997). 
READ: Competition is the disequilibrating, ongoing process that consists of the constant struggle among firms for a comparative advantage 
in resources that will yield a marketplace position of competitive advantage and, thereby, superior financial performance. Firms learn 
through competition as a result of feedback from relative financial performance “signaling” relative market position, which, in turn signals 
relative resources.                            
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Figure 3: Competitive Position Matrix 
Read: The marketplace position of competitive advantage identified as Cell 3A, for 
example, in segment A results from the firm, relative to its competitors, having a resource 
assortment that enables it to produce an offering that (a) is perceived to be of superior 
value by consumers in that segment and (b) is produced at lower costs than rivals. 
Note: Each competitive position matrix constitutes a different market segment (denoted 
as segment A, segment B,…). 
Source: Adapted from Hunt and Morgan (1997). 
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Figure 2. A Schematic of the Resource-Advantage Theory of Competition. Adapted from Hunt and Morgan (1997).
READ: Competition is the disequilibrating, ongoing process that consists of the constant struggle among firms for 
a comparative advantage in resources that will yield a marketplace position of competitive advantage and, thereby, 
superior financial performance. Firms learn through competition as a result of feedback from relative financial 
performance “signaling” relative market position, which, in turn signals relative resources.  
Figure 3. Competitive Position Matrix.  Adapted from Hunt and Morgan (1997).
Read: The marketplace position of competitive advantage identified as Cell 3A, for example, in segment A results from the 
firm, relative to its competitors, having a resource assortment that enables it to produce an offering that (a) is perceived to 
be of superior value by consumers in that segment and (b) is produced at lower costs than rivals.
Note: Each competitive position matrix constitutes a different market segment (denoted as segment A, segment B,…).Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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At its core, R-A theory combines heterogeneous de-
mand theory with a resource-based view of the firm 
(see premises P1, P6, and P7).  Contrasted with per-
fect competition, heterogeneous demand theory views 
intra-industry demand as significantly heterogeneous 
with  respect  to  consumers’  tastes  and  preferences. 
Hence, it is inappropriate to draw demand curves for 
most  industries.  Indeed,  because  of  heterogeneous 
intra-industry demand, industries are best viewed as 
collections  of  market  segments.    Therefore,  viewing 
products as bundles of attributes, different market of-
ferings or “bundles” are required for different market 
segments within the same industry. 
Contrasted with the view that the firm is a produc-
tion function that combines homogeneous, perfectly 
mobile “factors” of production, resource-based theory 
holds that the firm is a combiner of heterogeneous, 
imperfectly mobile entities that are labeled “resources.” 
These  heterogeneous,  imperfectly  mobile  resources, 
when combined with heterogeneous demand, imply 
significant diversity as to the sizes, scopes, and levels 
of profitability of firms within the same industry.  Re-
source-based theory parallels, if not undergirds, what 
Foss (1993) calls the “competence perspective” in evo-
lutionary economics and the “capabilities” approaches 
of Teece and Pisano (1994) and Langlois and Robert-
son (1995).  
As diagramed in Figures 2 and 3, R-A theory stress-
es the importance of (1) market segments, (2) hetero-
geneous firm resources, (3) comparative advantages/
disadvantages in resources, and (4) marketplace posi-
tions of competitive advantage/disadvantage.  In brief, 
market segments are defined as intra-industry groups 
of consumers whose tastes and preferences with regard 
to  an  industry’s  output  are  relatively  homogeneous.   
Resources are defined as the tangible and intangible 
entities available to the firm that enable it to produce 
efficiently and/or effectively a market offering that has 
value for some market segment(s).  Thus, resources 
are not just land, labor, and capital, as in neoclassical 
theory.  Rather, resources can be categorized as: 
•	 Financial	(e.g.,	cash	resources,	access	to	financial	
markets),
•	 Physical	(e.g.,	plant,	equipment),
•	 Legal	(e.g.,	trademarks,	licenses),
•	 Human	(e.g.,	the	skills	and	knowledge	of	individual	
employees),
•	 Organizational	(e.g.,	competences,	controls,	poli-
cies, culture),
•	 Informational	(e.g.,	knowledge	from	consumer	and	
competitive intelligence), and
•	 Relational	 (e.g.,	 relationships	 with	 suppliers	 and	
customers).
Each firm in the marketplace will have at least some re-
sources that are unique to it (e.g., very knowledgeable 
employees,  efficient  production  processes,  etc.)  that 
could constitute a comparative advantage in resources 
that could lead to positions of competitive advantage 
(i.e., cells 2, 3, and 6 in Figure 3) in the marketplace.   
Some of these resources are not easily copied or ac-
quired (i.e., they are relatively immobile).  Therefore, 
such resources (e.g., culture, competences, and pro-
cesses) may be a source of long-term competitive ad-
vantage in the marketplace.
Just as international trade theory recognizes that na-
tions have heterogeneous, immobile resources, and it 
focuses on the importance of comparative advantages 
in resources to explain the benefits of trade, R-A theory 
recognizes that many of the resources of firms within 
the same industry are significantly heterogeneous and 
relatively immobile.  Therefore, analogous to nations, 
some  firms  will  have  a  comparative  advantage  and 
others a comparative disadvantage in efficiently and/or 
effectively producing particular market offerings that 
have value for particular market segments.
Specifically, as shown in Figure 2 and further ex-
plicated in Figure 3, when firms have a comparative 
advantage in resources, they will occupy marketplace 
positions of competitive advantage for some market 
segment(s).  Marketplace positions of competitive ad-
vantage then result in superior financial performance.   
Similarly, when firms have a comparative disadvantage 
in resources they will occupy positions of competitive 
disadvantage, which will then produce inferior finan-
cial performance.  Therefore, firms compete for com-
parative advantages in resources that will yield mar-
ketplace positions of competitive advantage for some 
market  segment(s)  and,  thereby,  superior  financial 
performance.  As Figure 2 shows, how well competi-
tive processes work (to, for example, foster productiv-
ity and economic growth) is significantly influenced 
by five environmental factors: the societal resources on 
which firms draw, the societal institutions that form 
the “rules of the game” (North 1990), the actions of 14 Shelby D. Hunt
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competitors and suppliers, the behaviors of consum-
ers, and public policy decisions.
Consistent  with  its  Schumpeterian  heritage, 
R-A theory places great emphasis on innovation, both 
proactive and reactive.  The former is innovation by 
firms that, although motivated by the expectation of 
superior  financial  performance,  is  not  prompted  by 
specific competitive pressures—it is genuinely entre-
preneurial in the classic sense of entrepreneur.  In con-
trast, the latter is innovation that is directly prompted 
by the learning process of firms’ competing for the pa-
tronage of market segments.  Both proactive and reac-
tive innovation can be “radical” or “incremental,” and 
both contribute to the dynamism of R-A competition.
Firms (attempt to) learn in many ways—by formal 
market research, seeking out competitive intelligence, 
dissecting competitor’s products, benchmarking, and 
test marketing. What R-A theory adds to extant work 
is how the process of competition itself contributes to 
organizational learning.  As the feedback loops in Fig-
ure 2 show, firms learn through competition as a result 
of the feedback from relative financial performance 
signaling relative market position, which in turn sig-
nals  relative  resources.  When  firms  competing  for 
a market segment learn from their inferior financial 
performance that they occupy positions of competitive 
disadvantage (see Figure 3), they attempt to neutralize 
and/or leapfrog the advantaged firm(s) by acquisition 
and/or innovation.  That is, they attempt to acquire the 
same resource as the advantaged firm(s) and/or they 
attempt to innovate by imitating the resource, finding 
an equivalent resource, or finding (creating) a superior 
resource.  Here, “superior” implies that the innovating 
firm’s new resource enables it to surpass the previously 
advantaged competitor in terms of either relative costs 
(i.e., an efficiency advantage), or relative value (i.e., an 
effectiveness advantage), or both.  
Firms occupying positions of competitive advantage 
can continue to do so if (1) they continue to reinvest 
in the resources that produced the competitive advan-
tage, and (2) rivals’ acquisition and innovation efforts 
fail.  Rivals will fail (or take a long time to succeed) 
when an advantaged firm’s resources are either pro-
tected by such societal institutions as patents, or the 
advantage-producing resources are causally ambigu-
ous, socially or technologically complex, tacit, or have 
time compression diseconomies.
Competition,  then,  is  viewed  as  an  evolutionary, 
disequilibrium-provoking  process.    It  consists  of  the 
constant struggle among firms for comparative advan-
tages in resources that will yield marketplace positions 
of competitive advantage and, thereby, superior finan-
cial performance.  Once a firm’s comparative advantage 
in resources enables it to achieve superior performance 
through a position of competitive advantage in some 
market segment(s), competitors attempt to neutralize 
and/or leapfrog the advantaged firm through acquisition, 
imitation, substitution, or major innovation.  R-A theo-
ry is, therefore, inherently dynamic.  Disequilibrium, 
not equilibrium, is the norm.  In the terminology of 
Hodgson’s (1993) taxonomy of evolutionary economic 
theories, R-A theory is non-consummatory: it has no 
end-stage, only a never-ending process of change.  The 
implication is that, though market-based economies are 
moving, they are not moving toward some final state, 
such as a Pareto-optimal, general equilibrium.
Status of the R-A theory research 
program
Resource-advantage theory has been subjected to nu-
merous investigations.  These studies have revealed the 
theory to be able to explain, predict, and understand 
a wide range of phenomena.  What follows is a sample 
of the areas previously examined.  (To improve read-
ability, we do not provide multiple cites from individ-
ual articles.  Instead, we provide specific page numbers 
from  Hunt  (2000b),  which  in  turn  references  other 
articles.)
R-A theory contributes to explaining firm diversity 
(pp. 152-155), makes the correct prediction concern-
ing  financial  performance  diversity  (pp.  153-155), 
contributes to explaining observed differences in qual-
ity, innovativeness, and productivity between market-
based and command-based economies (pp. 169-170), 
shows why competition in market-based economies is 
dynamic (pp. 132-133), incorporates a resource-based 
view of the firm (pp. 85-86), incorporates the compe-
tence view of the firm (pp. 87-89), has the requisites 
of a phylogenetic, non-consummatory, and disequi-
librium-provoking theory of competition (pp. 23-24), 
explicates the view that competition is a process of 
knowledge discovery (pp. 29-30, 145-147), contributes 
to explaining why social relations constitute a resource 
only contingently (pp. 100-102), and has the requisites Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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of a moderately socialized theory of competition (pp. 
100-102).
In  addition,  R-A  theory  shows  how  path  depen-
dence effects occur (pp. 149-152), expands the concept 
of capital (pp. 186-190), predicts correctly that tech-
nological progress dominates the K/L (i.e., capital/la-
bor) ratio in economic growth (pp. 193-194), predicts 
correctly that increases in economic growth cause in-
creases in investment (pp. 194-199), predicts correctly 
that  most  of  the  technological  progress  that  drives 
economic growth stems from actions of profit-driven 
firms (pp. 199-200), predicts correctly that R-A com-
petition can prevent the economic stagnation that re-
sults from capital deepening (pp. 200-203), contributes 
to explaining the growth pattern of the (former) Soviet 
Union (pp. 201-203), provides a theoretical foundation 
for why formal institutions promoting property rights 
and economic freedom also promote economic growth 
(pp. 215-228), and has the requisites for a general the-
ory of competition that incorporates perfect competi-
tion as a limiting special case, thereby incorporating 
the predictive success of neoclassical theory and pre-
serving the cumulativeness of economic science (pp. 
240-243).
Trust, personal moral codes, R-A 
theory, and the wealth of nations
We  turn  now  to  explicating  the  process  by  which 
R-A theory can explain how macro-level, trust-pro-
moting institutions such as personal moral codes can 
contribute to (or from) firm-level, superior financial 
performance.  Recalling the role of relative, resource 
costs  and  resource-produced  value  in  R-A  theory, 
consider two organizations, A and B, that are compet-
ing for the same market segment.  Assume that A is 
located in an area populated primarily by neoclassical 
utility maximizers and B is in an area of deontologists 
(or, alternatively, B’s hiring procedures screen out util-
ity maximizers).  Because most of A’s employees will 
be guided by self-interest or utility maximization and 
B’s  by  a  code  stressing  deontological  ethics,  A  will 
have transformational costs (e.g. costs associated with 
shirking, cheating, monitoring, and free riding) that 
B avoids.  In R-A theory’s terms, the fact that B’s em-
ployees are guided by deontological ethics and hence, 
are trustworthy results in an intangible, comparative 
advantage-producing resource for B, when competing 
with A.  Ceteris paribus, B will then occupy a market-
place position of competitive advantage in Figure 3 vis-
à-vis A and enjoy superior financial performance—its 
primary objective.
Now  recall  that  organizational  competences  are 
a form of resource in R-A theory and that such com-
petences are heterogeneously distributed among firms.   
Furthermore, assume that both A and B seek a strate-
gic alliance with C, who has a particular competence 
that both A and B lack.  For example, perhaps C can 
produce a key component of A’s and B’s products that 
is of particularly high quality—a quality that neither 
A nor B can match.  Further assume that, because of 
their employees’ different moral codes, B has a reputa-
tion for integrity and A for opportunism.  Because C 
would fear A’s opportunism, C would either (1) decline 
the alliance or (2) insist that A absorb the high moni-
toring and other costs resulting from A’s moral code.   
In contrast, B is an attractive partner for C because C 
recognizes that B’s moral code lessens the likelihood of 
B engaging in opportunistic behavior.  Thus, B will be 
able to align itself with C, and A will have to do without 
C’s competence.  B’s strategic alliance with C will then 
become what R-A theory calls a “relational resource” 
that makes B more effective in competing with A.  That 
is, B is now more likely to achieve marketplace posi-
tions identified as cells 2 and 3 in Figure 3 and, thus, 
enjoy superior financial performance.
Now  assume  that  A  and  B  are  nation-states,  in-
stead  of  organizations,  where  A’s  dominant  culture 
has a moral code tending toward neoclassical utility 
maximization and B’s toward deontological ethics.  Ce-
teris paribus, A will be less productive than B for three 
reasons.  First, the firms in A must absorb transaction 
and transformational costs that the firms in B avoid.   
Therefore, B is more efficient than A in producing val-
ued market offerings.  Second, recalling again that or-
ganizational competences are heterogeneous, firms in 
A will be less successful in forming cooperative allianc-
es or networks.  Therefore, the alliances and networks 
in B will make it more effective than A in producing 
valued market offerings for both domestic and global 
markets.  B’s greater efficiency and effectiveness, there-
fore, increases its productivity relative to A.  Third, as-
sume that firms in A are competing with those in B for 
the business of firms in nation C.  Ceteris paribus, B’s 
firms will be in an advantageous position over those 16 Shelby D. Hunt
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in A because B’s firms will be both more efficient and 
more effective in producing valued market offerings.   
Therefore, nation B is better able than A to reap the 
gains from trade with C, resulting in further increases 
in B’s productivity and growth, relative to A.
Recall that a resource is any entity, tangible or intan-
gible, that is available to (not necessarily owned by) the 
firm that enables it to produce valued market offerings.   
The preceding analysis implies that, just as employees 
having  a  moral  code  stressing  deontological  ethics 
constitutes a firm resource, a society having a domi-
nant culture with a moral code stressing deontologi-
cal ethics has a societal resource upon which firms can 
draw.    Thus,  R-A  theory—alone  among  theories  of 
competition—can explain how such macro-level, in-
formal institutions as moral codes can contribute to 
(or from) firm-level, superior financial performance.   
In so doing, it contributes to explaining how societal 
institutions that promote social trust also promote the 
wealth of nations.
Conclusion
Scholars  from  numerous  disciplines  maintain  that 
societal-level  moral  codes  that  promote  social  trust 
promote wealth creation.  Despite this consensus, the 
nature of the kinds of societal-level moral codes that 
promote social trust remains unclear.  Also remaining 
unclear is the specific competitive process by which so-
cial trust promotes productivity and economic growth, 
that is, wealth creation.  Using the Hunt-Vitell theory 
of ethics, this article explicates the concept of personal 
moral codes as a means of understanding societal-level 
moral codes.  We show that societal-level codes based 
on utility maximization promote social distrust.  In 
contrast, societal-level codes based on deontological 
ethics promote social trust.  Furthermore, we show 
how, using the resource-advantage theory of compe-
tition,  that  societal-level  moral  codes  that  produce 
social trust also promote productivity and economic 
growth.  Thus, we explain how social trust promotes 
the wealth of nations.  
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